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ABORIGINAL TITLE AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS:
WHAT'S THE CONNECTION?
KENT MCNEIL *
The author presents an analysis and critique of
the current law and judicial treatment of legal
issues relating to the rights of Aboriginal peoples.
His focus is an examination of the connection
between Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title to
land
The author analyzes recent Supreme Court of
Canada decisions which attempt to clarify the body
of law in this area. R. v. Van der Peet R. v.
Adams, and R. v. Cit reveal that Aboriginal title
is just a subset of Aboriginal rights, and that free-
standing Aboriginal rights such as hunting and
fishing rights can exist independently of Aboriginal
title. The author offers a critique of the Supreme
Court of Canada's approach to identification and
definition of Aboriginal rights, and contrasts it with
the application of general principles relating to
occupation of land in the context of a claim to
Aboriginal title. His arguments are based in part on
authorities from England, Australia and the United
States.
L 'auteur propose une analyse et une critique du
droit actuel et de la fapon dont les tribunaux
traitent les questions d'ordre juridique lies aux
droits des peuples autochtones. 11 se penche plus
particuliirement sur les liens entre les droits
ancestraux et les titres aborigines.
L 'auteur examine les dcisions rdcentes de la Cour
supreme dans la trilogie R. c. Van der Peet, R. c.
Adams et R. c. Ct , rivilant que le titre aborigine
n 'est qu 'un sous-ensemble des droits autochtones, et
que les droits naturels de pdche et de chasse
peuvent exister indipendamment d'un titre
aborigine. L 'auteur critique I'approche adoptie par
la Cour suprdme en ce qui touche l'identification et
la definition des droits autochtones, et la compare
,6 I'application des principes ginifraux relatifs h
I'occupation du territoire dans le contexte de la
revendication d'un titre aborigine. 1l s'appuie en
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I. INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence relating to the rights of the Aboriginal peoples is probably the
most uncertain and contentious body of law in Canada. A major reason for the
uncertainty is no doubt the fact that when Canada was colonized by France and Britain
there were no established civil or common law doctrines that could be applied to
ascertain the status and rights of the peoples who occupied North America as
independent nations prior to the imposition of European sovereignty. New law therefore
had to be created to deal with this unique situation. As events preceded the formulation
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. I am grateful to Brian Slattery for reading a draft of this
article and making very helpful suggestions.
of legal norms, judges were left with the difficult task of trying to come up with
appropriate rules to regulate relationships and determine rights long after the fact.
This process is still going on today. Remarkably, many major issues involving
the rights of the Aboriginal peoples remain unresolved. For example, it is still uncertain
whether Canadian law acknowledges that the Aboriginal peoples have an inherent right
of self-government. The status, meaning and effect of treaties that many Aboriginal
nations signed with the French, British and Canadian governments continue to be
subject to debate. As recently as 1984, the Supreme Court of Canada decided for the
first time that the Crown owes a legally-enforceable fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal
peoples,' but the scope and consequences of that duty are still ambiguous. The list
could go on. Gradually, however, the Supreme Court is providing more clarity and
coherence to the distinctive body of law relating specifically to the Aboriginal peoples.
In this article, I am going to focus on an issue that the Supreme Court has grappled
with recently, and clarified to some extent -- namely, the connection between
Aboriginal rights generally and Aboriginal title to land.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
The most important Aboriginal rights case decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada in 1996 was undoubtedly R. v. Van der Peet.2 For the first time, the Court laid
down a test for determining whether a particular activity is protected as an Aboriginal
right for the purposes of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.' In Lamer C.J.C.'s
words, "in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice,
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming
the right."4 Moreover, in his view the time for applying this "integral to the distinctive
culture" test is the period prior to contact between the Aboriginal group and
Europeans.5 Because the Court found that the particular activity Dorothy Van der Peet
had been engaged in when charged under the federal Fisheries Act6 - namely,
exchanging fish for money or other goods - had not been an integral part of the
distinctive culture of her people before Europeans arrived, it is not protected today as
an Aboriginal right. Her conviction for selling fish caught under the authority of an
Indian food fish licence was therefore upheld.
Both the "integral to the distinctive culture" test and the time frame for its
application have been criticized elsewhere.7 In this article, my intention in this context
Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 [hereinafter Guerin].
2 R v. Van der Peet, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 177 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Van der Peet].
3 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Section 35(1) provides: "The existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."
4 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 201 (para. 46).
5 ibid at 205-207. Compare L'Heureux-DubM and McLachlin JJ.'s dissenting opinions at 234-39 (paras.
164-79), 260-62 (paras. 244-50), respectively.
6 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, s. 61, now R.S.C. 1985, c. F.14, s. 79(1).
In addition to the dissenting judgments of L'Heureux-Dub16 and McLachlin JJ. in Van der Peet, see
J. Borrows, "The Trickster: Integral to a Distinctive Culture" (1997) 8 Constitutional Forum 27; LI.
Rotman, "Hunting for Answers in a Strange Kettle of Fish: Unilateralism, Paternalism and Fiduciary
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is not to reassess the test as such, but rather to consider how it relates to the connection
between Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title to land, and to suggest how the test
might apply to an Aboriginal title claim.
As Van der Peet involved a claim to an Aboriginal right to sell or exchange fish,
Aboriginal title to land was not at issue in the case. However, Lamer C.J.C. did make
the general statement that "Aboriginal title is the aspect of Aboriginal rights related
specifically to Aboriginal claims to land; it is the way in which the common law
recognizes Aboriginal land rights."8 He went on to say that "[b]oth Aboriginal title and
Aboriginal rights arise from the existence of distinctive Aboriginal communities
occupying 'the land as their forefathers had done for centuries'."' He did not, however,
specify the circumstances in which occupation of land by an Aboriginal community
would give rise to Aboriginal title, rather than to some other Aboriginal right or rights.
This issue of the connection between Aboriginal rights and title came before the
Supreme Court more directly in the decisions it handed down six weeks after Van der
Peet in R. v. Adams10 and R. v. Cdtd." Both of these cases arose in Quebec, and
involved claims to an Aboriginal right to fish for food by a Mohawk from Akwesasne
and Algonquins from the Maniwaki reserve, respectively. The issue of Aboriginal title
was raised because in Adams the Crown argued, and in C6tg all the parties assumed,
that an Aboriginal right to fish could not exist apart from Aboriginal title to land. The
Crown in each case denied that the Mohawks and Algonquins had such a title where
the fishing took place. For this reason, Lamer C.J.C., who wrote the principal judgment
in each case, stated the main issue in these terms in Adams:
In resolving this appeal and the appeal in C6td, this Court must answer the question of
whether Aboriginal rights are necessarily based in Aboriginal title to land, so that the
fundamental claim that must be made in any Aboriginal rights case is to Aboriginal title, or
whether Aboriginal title is instead one sub-set of the larger category of Aboriginal rights, so
that fishing and other Aboriginal rights can exist independently of a claim to Aboriginal
title. 2
Lamer C.J.C. resolved this question in each case by deciding that Aboriginal title is
indeed a sub-set of Aboriginal rights, so a free-standing Aboriginal right such as a right
to fish for food can exist independently of Aboriginal title. For this, and other reasons
Rhetoric in Badger and Van der Peet' (1997) 8 Constitutional Forum 40; K. McNeil, "Reduction by
Definition: The Supreme Court's Treatment of Aboriginal Rights in 1996" (1997) 5: 3 & 4 Canada
Watch 60; J. Gray, "0 Canada! - Van der Peet as Guidance on the Construction of Native Title
Rights" (1997) 2:1 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 18; K. Gallagher-Mackay, "Interpreting Self-
Government: Approaches to Building Cultural Authority" [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. (forthcoming).
Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 194 (para. 33).
Ibid. quoting from Judson J.'sjudgment in Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 at
328 [hereinafter Calder] (Calder, of course, did involve an Aboriginal title claim).
SR. v. Adams, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. I (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Adams].
R. v. Cdtd, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 26 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Cdtd].
2 Adams, supra note 10 at 4 (para. 3). See also C6td, ibid. at 31 (para. 3).
which are not relevant to our discussion, he decided the appeals in favour of the
accused, with one exception. 3
Lamer C.J.C.'s more extensive treatment of the connection between Aboriginal
title and Aboriginal rights is found in Adams. In that decision, he supported his
conclusion that Aboriginal rights can exist independently of Aboriginal title by
reference to the "integral to the distinctive culture" test laid down in Van der Peet. In
an important passage that deserves to be quoted in full, he wrote:
What this test, along with the conceptual basis which underlies it, indicates, is that while
claims to Aboriginal title fall within the conceptual framework of Aboriginal rights,
Aboriginal rights do not exist solely where a claim to Aboriginal title has been made out.
Where an Aboriginal group has shown that a particular activity, custom or tradition taking
place on the land was integral to the distinctive culture of that group then, even if they have
not shown that their occupation and use of the land was sufficient to support a claim of title
to the land, they will have demonstrated that they have an Aboriginal right to engage in that
practice, custom or tradition. The Van der Peet test protects activities which were integral
to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right; it does not require that
the group satisfy the further hurdle of demonstrating that their connection with the piece of
land on which the activity was taking place was of a central significance to their distinctive
culture sufficient to make out a claim to Aboriginal title to the land. Van der Peet establishes
that s.35 [of the Constitution Act, 1982] recognizes and affirms the rights of those peoples
who occupied North America prior to the arrival of the Europeans; that recognition and
affirmation is not limited to those circumstances where an Aboriginal group's relationship
with the land is of a kind sufficient to establish title to the land.1
4
What Lamer C.J.C. seems to have in mind are different kinds or degrees of
connection with the land, some of which are adequate to make out an Aboriginal right
to fish or carry on other activities on that land without being sufficient to establish
Aboriginal title. This is apparent from the reliance he placed on the relationship
Aboriginal peoples have with the land as an element that underlies some of their
Aboriginal rights. In a passage from Van der Peet which he quoted in support of his
analysis in Adams, Lamer C.J.C. linked this relationship with Aboriginal cultures:
Aboriginal rights arise from the prior occupation of land, but they also arise from the prior
social organization and distinctive cultures of Aboriginal peoples on that land. In considering
whether a claim to an Aboriginal right has been made out, courts must look at both the
relationship of an Aboriginal claimant to the land and at the practices, customs and traditions
arising from the claimant's distinctive culture and society. 5
3 The exception was that the convictions of the accused in C6tM, ibid. under the Regulation respecting
controlled zones, R.R.Q. 1981, Supp., at 370, s. 5.1, were upheld because the Court decided that that
Regulation, unlike the Quebec Fishery Regulations, C.R.C., c. 852, s. 4(1), did not infringe the
accused's Aboriginal right to fish for food.
'4 Adams, supra note 10 at 11 (para. 26) [emphasis in original]. Lamer C.J.C. quoted from and relied
on this passage in coming to the same conclusion in C6d, supra note II at 42 (para. 38).
'5 Adams, ibid. at 12 (para. 29) [emphasis in original], quoting from Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 210
(para. 74).
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Moreover, Lamer C.J.C. said in Adams that an Aboriginal right to hunt or fish that
exists independently of Aboriginal title may still be site-specific so that it can only be
practised on the tract of land where those activities have historically been carried out
by the Aboriginal people claiming the right. In his words, "[a] site-specific hunting or
fishing right does not, simply because it is independent of Aboriginal title to the land
on which it took place, become an abstract fishing or hunting right exercisable
anywhere; it continues to be a right to hunt or fish on the tract of land in question." 6
However, while Lamer C.J.C. affirmed in C6t that "an Aboriginal right will often be
defined in site-specific terms,"' 7 he did not say that that would invariably be the case.
Given that Aboriginal rights which are not site-specific would not depend on
occupation of specific land, occupation of land does not seem to be a requirement for
every Aboriginal right.
Although Lamer C.J.C. did not specify the degree of occupation of land required
to establish Aboriginal title, evidently he regarded permanence of occupation as a factor
to be taken into account. In Adams, he wrote:
To understand why Aboriginal rights cannot be inexorably linked to Aboriginal title it is only
necessary to recall that some Aboriginal peoples were nomadic, varying the location of their
settlements with the season and changing circumstances. That this was the case does not alter
the fact that nomadic peoples survived through reliance on the land prior to contact with
Europeans and, further, that many of the customs, practices and traditions of nomadic peoples
that took place on the land were integral to their distinctive cultures.'8
Continuing this line of thought, Lamer C.J.C. added:
Moreover, some Aboriginal peoples varied the location of their settlements both before and
after contact. The Mohawks are one such people.... That this is the case may (although I take
no position on this point) preclude the establishment of Aboriginal title to the lands on which
they settled; however, it in no way subtracts from the fact that, wherever they were settled
before or after contact, prior to contact the Mohawks engaged in practices, traditions or
customs on the land which were integral to their distinctive culture.19
The picture which emerges from Lamer C.J.C.'s discussions of the relationship
between Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights in Adams and C6t can be summarized
as follows. Aboriginal title depends on proof of a connection with specific land that
meets an as yet undefined threshold of sufficient occupation, one aspect of which is a
degree of permanence that is also undefined. Moreover, a literal reading of Lamer
C.J.C.'s judgment in Adams suggests that the connection with the land must have been
integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal people in question prior to contact
with Europeans. Free-standing Aboriginal rights, such as a right to hunt or fish, may
or may not involve a connection with specific lands, but even where such a connection
16 Adams, ibid. at 13 (para. 30) [emphasis in original].
'7 Cttd, supra note 11 at 43 (para. 39).
's Adams, supra note 10 at 11-12 (para. 27).
'9 Ibid. at 12 (para. 28) [emphasis in original].
exists and makes the rights site-specific, the degree and permanence of the occupation
is less than that required for Aboriginal title. Also, in the case of these free-standing
rights it seems that it is the activity on the land that must be integral to the distinctive
culture of the Aboriginal people in question rather than the connection with the land
itself. Moreover, while some Aboriginal peoples may be unable to claim Aboriginal
title because they were "nomadic" and so did not have a sufficiently permanent
connection with any land, apparently all Aboriginal people would be entitled to some
Aboriginal rights, as Lamer C.J.C. wrote in Adams that "[t]he Aboriginal rights
recognized and affirmed by s.35(l) should not be understood or defined in a manner
which excludes some of those the provision was intended to protect."2 Finally, even
where free-standing Aboriginal rights are site-specific, apparently the locations where
they may be practised can shift even after contact, as could have happened in the case
of the Mohawks. However, Lamer C.J.C. expressly left undecided the question of
whether Aboriginal title can shift from lands where an Aboriginal people had a
sufficient connection prior to contact to other lands where they established such a
connection after contact.
Another major issue which was left undecided in the above cases is the nature
or content of Aboriginal title. Van der Peet, Adams and C6t6 clarified that the nature
of free-standing Aboriginal rights depends on the activities engaged in by an Aboriginal
people that were elements of practices, customs and traditions integral to their
distinctive culture prior to European contact.2 But while Adams and C6t, by
classifying Aboriginal title as a sub-set of Aboriginal rights, indicate that the "integral
to the distinctive culture" test may apply to Aboriginal title as well as to other
Aboriginal rights, the implications of this for the content of Aboriginal title remain
unclear. In my view, this will depend on how the test is applied.
One possibility would be to apply the test only to determine whether an
Aboriginal people had a connection with specific land prior to European contact that
meets the undefined threshold required for Aboriginal title. If they could prove they had
a connection that was integral to their distinctive culture, they would have Aboriginal
title. The content of that title would then be determined by general principles relating
to occupation of land rather than by their specific pre-contact activities on that land. A
second possible approach would be to apply the "integral to the distinctive culture" test
not just to determine whether they had the requisite connection with the land, but also
to determine the content of their Aboriginal title after that connection had been
established. For reasons to be elaborated below, an approach that applies the test to the
establishment but not to the content of Aboriginal title is preferable because it is more
in accord with common law principles and accepted norms of non-discrimination, and
conforms with established judicial precedents.
20 Ibid. (para. 27).
21 See also R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 65 (S.C.C.); R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 4
C.N.L.R. 130 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pamajewon, [19961 4 C.N.L.R. 164 (S.C.C.).
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III. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
A. PROOF OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
In our discussion of Van der Peet, Adams, and Ct6, we saw that free-standing
Aboriginal rights such as a right to hunt or fish can be proven by showing that the
activity in question was an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the
distinctive culture of the Aboriginal people claiming the right prior to contact with
Europeans. Free-standing Aboriginal rights may or may not be site-specific, depending
on whether their exercise was connected to specific lands at the relevant time.
Aboriginal title, on the other hand, seems to involve proof of a connection with the land
itself that was integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal claimants. Moreover,
this connection must somehow be greater and more permanent than the connection
required to establish a site-specific Aboriginal right. Finally, if the Van der Peet time
frame for establishing a free-standing Aboriginal right is applied to Aboriginal title, the
requisite connection with the land would have to be proven to have existed prior to the
time of European contact. Each of these elements of the connection with the land
approach will be analyzed in turn.
1. A Connection Integral to the Distinctive Culture
In order to determine how the "integral to the distinctive culture" test might
apply to Aboriginal title, we need to examine it more closely. In Van der Peet, Lamer
C.J.C. elaborated on the test by explaining some of the factors a court should consider
in determining the existence of an Aboriginal right. First of all, he said that the
perspective of the Aboriginal people claiming the right must be taken into account.
However, he qualified this by saying that "that perspective must be framed in terms
cognizable to the Canadian legal and constitutional structure."22 He justified this
qualification by adopting a purposive analysis of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
From this analysis, he concluded that "what s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional
framework through which the fact that Aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive
societies, with their own practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and
reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown."23 Sensitivity to the Aboriginal
perspective therefore has to be balanced with the common law perspective of the non-
Aboriginal legal system.24
The next factor a court must look at is the nature of the Aboriginal right being
claimed. Lamer C.J.C. provided the following directions to guide this stage of the
inquiry:
To characterize an applicant's claim correctly, a court should consider such factors as the
nature of the action which the applicant is claiming was done pursuant to an Aboriginal right,
22 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 202 (para. 49).
23 Ibid. at 193 (para. 31).
21 Ibid. at 202 (paras. 49-50).
the nature of the governmental regulation, statute or action being impugned, and the tradition,
custom or practice being relied upon to establish the right.25
Once the nature of the claimed right has been correctly identified, a court has to
determine whether the practice, custom or tradition relied upon to establish it was "a
central and significant part of the [Aboriginal] society's distinctive culture."26 Here the
burden lies on the claimant to demonstrate "that the practice, tradition or custom was
one of the things which made the culture of the society distinctive - that it was one
of the things that truly made the society what it was."27 Lamer C.J.C. explained further
that
[t]he court cannot look at those aspects of the Aboriginal society that are true of every human
society (e.g., eating to survive), nor can it look at those aspects of the Aboriginal society that
are only incidental or occasional to that society; the court must look instead to the defining
and central attributes of the Aboriginal society in question.28
However, while the practice, custom or tradition has to be "distinctive" in the sense that
it is a distinguishing characteristic of the society, it does not have to be "distinct" in
the sense of being unique. 29
I have difficulty reconciling Lamer C.J.C.'s assertion that the practice, custom or
tradition in question does not have to be distinct with his statement that it cannot be an
aspect of the society which is true of every human society. Why should it be
disqualified because it happens to be common to all rather than just many human
societies, as long as it is a defining characteristic of the society in question? Lamer
C.J.C. himself gave the example of fishing for food, which was acknowledged to be an
Aboriginal right of the Musqueam Nation in R. v. Sparrow.30 As he pointed out,
fishing for food is hardly distinct in the sense of being unique to the Musqueams, as
it is practiced by many societies around the world.3 So would it cease to qualify as
an Aboriginal right, as Lamer C.J.C. seems to have suggested, if it were shown that all
human societies fish for food? With all due respect, that would make no sense, as it
would not make fishing for food any less distinctive for the Musqueams. I therefore
think that one should disregard Lamer C.J.C.'s obiter dictum about aspects of an
Aboriginal society that are true of every human society.
Now that we have a clearer idea of what the "integral to the distinctive culture"
test involves, we can attempt to assess its application to an Aboriginal title claim. As
it seems to be the connection with the land that must be integral to the distinctive
culture where Aboriginal title is concerned, we need to determine what is required to
establish that connection.
25 Ibid. at 203 (para. 53).
26 Ibid. at 204 (para. 55).
27 Ibid. [emphasis in original].
28 Ibid. (para. 56).
29 Ibid. at 209 (para. 71).
'o R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Sparrow].
31 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 209 (para. 72).
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Following Lamer C.J.C.'s directions, first we need to take into account the
perspective of the Aboriginal people making the claim. This could be revealed by
testimony from their elders as custodians of the people's oral history and traditions. As
Lamer C.J.C. said that this perspective must be framed in terms cognizable to the non-
Aboriginal legal system, interpretive testimony from anthropologists and other outside
experts would probably be of assistance as well. However, that testimony should not
be allowed to overshadow the evidence provided by the Aboriginal people themselves
because it is their perspective - not the perspective of non-Aboriginal observers and
interpreters - that must be ascertained. 32
According to Lamer C.J.C., the next factor to be considered is the nature of the
right being claimed. In this respect, a claim to Aboriginal title is qualitatively different
from a claim to free-standing rights, such as a right to hunt or fish. The latter amounts
to rights to pursue activities on the land, whereas Aboriginal title amounts to a right to
the land itself. Conceptually, therefore, Aboriginal title is different from a collection of
rights to pursue various activities on the land, each of which could be established as a
free-standing right, as in Adams and C6td, without any need to establish title to the land
itself. A claim to Aboriginal title would therefore seem to involve a claim that the land
belonged to the Aboriginal claimants, in accordance with their practices, customs and
traditions, and taking account of their own perspective. Considering such a claim in
terms cognizable to the common law legal system," it would be akin to a claim to
ownership.34 If established, it should entitle the claimants to conduct any activities
permitted by law on the land for as long as their title endures. While at common law
the Crown may have the underlying title to the land as a concomitant of sovereignty,
3
"
as will be discussed in more detail below this does not mean that the Crown has any
beneficial interest.
After the nature of the claimed right has been identified, Lamer C.J.C. said that
it has to be determined whether the practice, custom or tradition relied on to establish
it was a central and significant part of the Aboriginal society's distinctive culture. In the
context of an Aboriginal title claim, relevant practices would encompass the activities
and ceremonies the people conducted in relation to the land, including the use they
made of the land for their physical needs. No doubt these practices would be
intertwined with their customs and traditions. Taking into account their perspectives,
32 See the discussion in J. Borrows & L.I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does
It Make a Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9; J.Y. Henderson, "Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties"
(1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 46.
" Note that, while the civil law system generally applies to property rights in Quebec, throughout
Canada "the law of Aboriginal title represents a distinct species of federal common law rather than
a simple subset of the common or civil law or property law operating within the province": C6t6,
supra note 11 at 47 (para. 49), relying on Roberts v. Canada, 11989] 1 S.C.R. 322 at 340.
14 See generally B. Rudden, "The Terminology of Title" (1964) 80 L.Q. Rev. 63; A.M. Honord,
"Ownership" in A.G. Guest, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1961) 107.
3' See Sparrow, supra note 30 at 177; Mabo v. Queensland [No. 21 (1992) 175 C.L.R. I at 41-52 (H.C.
Aust.), Brennan J. (as he then was) [hereinafter Mabo]; and, more generally, K. McNeil, Common
Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) especially 79-107, 216-21 [hereinafter
Common Law Aboriginal Title].
their relationship with the land would likely be multi-dimensional, involving spiritual
elements, responsibilities, and a sense of belonging, as well as physical sustenance.
Given the undeniable significance that Aboriginal peoples generally attribute to the land
and their relationship to it,36 proving a connection with the land that was integral to
their distinctive culture in the sense of being central to their existence as a society
would probably not present much difficulty for most Aboriginal peoples.
2. Occupation and Use Necessary to Establish the Connection
We have seen that to establish Aboriginal title a greater and more permanent
connection with the land is required than for a free-standing Aboriginal right, such as
a site-specific fishing right.37 But what kind of connection is necessary? Lamer
C.J.C.'s judgments in Adams and C6t6 provide scant guidance to answer this question,
apart from his intimation that peoples who "were nomadic, varying the location of their
settlements with the season and changing circumstances," might not qualify.3" He
nonetheless suggested that Aboriginal title would be proven if the claimants could show
"that their occupation and use of the land was sufficient to support a claim of title to
the land."39 This implies some kind of threshold or standard of occupation and use
which, if met, would establish the claimants' Aboriginal title. Following Lamer C.J.C.'s
instructions, this standard should be identified by taking the perspectives of the
Aboriginal peoples and the non-Aboriginal legal system into account.
At common law, occupation and use are closely related because proof of
occupation of land usually depends on evidence of use.4" Generally, any acts in
relation to land that indicate an intention to hold it for one's own purposes are evidence
of occupation.4' However, occupation is a relative matter, depending on the nature of
the land and the uses to which it can practically be put at the time.42 For example, in
Red House Farms (Thorndon) Ltd. v. Catchpole, the English Court of Appeal decided
that shooting on a regular basis over a marshy, undeveloped tract of land was sufficient
to establish occupation. "3 Moreover, "the conditions of life and the habits and ideas
36 See Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Restructuring the Relationship, vol. 2,
part 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 421-64 [hereinafter Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples].
3' See text accompanying notes 14-20, supra.
38 Adams, supra note 10 at 12 (para. 27).
39 Ibid. at 11 (para. 26) [emphasis in original] (for context for this quotation, see text accompanying
note 14, supra).
40 For more detailed discussion, see Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35 at 197-204.
41 See generally F. Pollock & R.S. Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1888) at 28-36; J.M. Lightwood, A Treatise on Possession of Land (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1894) at 9-27; R.D.C. Stewart, "The Differences Between Possession of Land and
Chattels" (1933) 11 Can. Bar Rev. 651 at 652-56.
42 See Lord Advocate v. Lord Lovat (1880), 5 App. Cas. 273 at 288 (H.L.); Kirby v. Cowderoy, [1912]
A.C. 599 at 602-603 (P.C.) [hereinafter Kirby]; Wuta-Ofei v. Danquah, [1961] 3 All E.R. 596 at 600
(P.C.).
4' (1976), 244 E.G. 295 (C.A.) (leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused) [hereinafter Red House
Farms]. See also Harper v. Charlesworth (1825), 4 B. & C. 574 (K.B.). In Curzon v. Lomax (1803),
5 Esp. 60 (K.B.), and Bristow v. Cormican (1874), I.R. 10 C.L. 398 at 408 (Ex.), aft'd(1878), 3 App.
Cas. 641 (H.L.), fishing was accepted as evidence of occupation.
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of the people" living in the locality are factors to be considered." The common law
therefore supports an approach that would set a standard of occupation for Aboriginal
title that takes the Aboriginal peoples' ways of life and customs into account. This
approach also entails the kind of balance Lamer C.J.C. had in mind between the
perspectives of the Aboriginal peoples and the non-Aboriginal legal system.
Applying common law authorities on relativity of occupation, and taking the
Aboriginal peoples' perspectives into account, we need to reassess Lamer C.J.C.'s obiter
suggestion that nomadic peoples would not qualify for Aboriginal title. If he meant that
people who wandered from place to place without forming any lasting attachment to
any particular tract of land would not be in occupation, he is probably right. But in fact
it is very doubtful whether any Aboriginal people lived that way prior to European
colonization of what is now Canada. To survive in what were often harsh environments,
hunting and gathering peoples had to have an intimate knowledge of the land and the
seasonal and other resources it provided. Rather than wander indiscriminately, they
would return on a regular basis to the places where food and the other materials for the
maintenance of their ways of life were available. They formed deep attachments with
the land they knew and used, usually involving obligations to care for and conserve it
as they derived their sustenance from it, all of which was intertwined with their
spiritual and socio-political as well as their physical existence. 45 As stated in the
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
[blefore the arrival of Europeans, virtually all of Canada was inhabited and used by
Aboriginal peoples. Whether they were comparatively settled fishers and horticulturalists or
wide-ranging hunters, each people occupied specific territories and had systems of tenure,
access and resource conservation that amounted to ownership and governance - although
those systems were not readily understood by Europeans, in part because of language and
cultural differences.'
Although of a different nature, the connection of hunter-gatherers with the land
would be just as integral to their distinctive cultures as that of horticulturalists.
Evaluating their connection with the land on the basis of their conditions of life and
their own perspectives, they would no doubt be in occupation. This was the conclusion
Cadija Umma v. S. Don Manis Appu (1938), [1939] A.C. 136 at 141-42 [hereinafter Cadia Umma].
See also Sherren v. Pearson (1887), 14 S.C.R. 581 at 585-86; Halifax Power Co. v. Christie (1915),
48 N.S.R. 264 at 267.
41 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 36 at 434-37, 448-64.
Ibid. at 452. For examples of studies of specific Aboriginal peoples, see H. Hickerson, "Land Tenure
of the Rainy Lake Chippewa at the Beginning of the 19th Century" (1967) 2 Smithsonian
Contributions to Anthropology 41; J. Helm, "The Nature of Dogrib Socioterritorial Groups" in R.B.
Lee & I. DeVore, eds., Man the Hunter (New York: Aldine Publishing, 1968) 118; H. Brody, Maps
and Dreams: Indians and the British Columbia Frontier (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books,
1983). More generally, see R. Dyson-Hudson & E.A. Smith, "Human Territoriality: An Ecological
Reassessment" (1978) 80 American Anthropologist 21; D. Riches, Northern Nomadic Hunter-
Gatherers: A Humanistic Approach (London: Academic Press, 1982) especially 107-33; T. Ingold,
"Territoriality and Tenure: The Appropriation of Space in Hunting and Gathering Societies" in The
Appropriation of Nature: Essays on Human Ecology and Social Relations (Iowa City: University of
Iowa Press, 1987) 130-64.
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the United States Supreme Court reached over 160 years ago in Mitchel v. United
States, where Baldwin J., for the Court, said the Indian occupation "was considered
with reference to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much
in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites. 47
3. The Time Frame for Proving Aboriginal Title
A final issue to address in the context of proof of Aboriginal title is the question
of when the requisite connection with the land has to be shown to have existed. It will
be recalled that in Van der Peet Lamer C.J.C. said that the practice, custom or tradition
relied on as the basis of an Aboriginal right must have been integral to the distinctive
culture of the claimants prior to contact with Europeans. He justified this by saying
that, "[b]ecause it is the fact that distinctive Aboriginal societies lived on the land prior
to the arrival of Europeans that underlies the Aboriginal rights protected by s.35(1) [of
the Constitution Act, 1982], it is to that pre-contact period that the courts must look in
identifying Aboriginal rights. 48
Moreover, in addition to proof that the practice, custom or tradition was integral
to the society prior to contact, it appears that continuity with a present-day practice,
custom or tradition must also be established.49 However, Lamer C.J.C. said that the
continuity concept does not require "evidence of an unbroken chain of continuity
between their current practices, traditions and customs, and those which existed prior
to contact., 50 But while an interruption in a practice, custom or tradition will not
preclude the present-day existence of an Aboriginal right, Lamer C.J.C. took no
position on the question of whether an Aboriginal right can be lost as a result of the
disappearance of the practice, custom or tradition on which it was based.5
Lamer C.J.C.'s pre-contact time frame for proof of Aboriginal rights was
criticized by both L'Heureux-Dub and McLachlin JJ. in their dissenting judgments in
Van der Peet.52 Rather than enter that debate where Aboriginal rights in general are
concerned, I am going to focus my comments on the inapplicability of that time frame
to a claim to Aboriginal title. We have seen that Lamer C.J.C. apparently accepted in
Van der Peet, Adams, and C6t6 that Aboriginal title involves rights to the land itself,
rather than just rights to exercise activities on the land. Rights to land are necessarily
proprietary in nature. While Aboriginal title may not fit into any common law
' 9 Pet. 711 at 746 (1835). See also United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 at
345-46 (1941); Northwestern Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 at 338-40 (1945); Sac
and Fox Tribe v. United States, 383 F. 2d 991 at 998 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1967) [hereinafter Sac and Fox
Tribe]; United States v. Seminole Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375 at 383-86 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1967).
48 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 205 (para. 60).
41 Ibid. at 205-207 (paras. 63-65).
o Ibid. at 206 (para. 65).
' Ibid. at 206-207 (paras. 63-65). Compare R. v. Sioui, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127 at 154, where Lamer
J. (as he then was) held that a treaty right would not be lost by non-user.
52 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 234-39 (paras. 164-79), 260-62 (paras. 244-50).
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categories of real property because it has been classified as sui generis," it is
nonetheless an interest in land that enjoys legal protection like any other property
interest.54 However, it differs from most other interests in land because it originates
in the Aboriginal peoples' occupation and use of lands prior to acquisition of
sovereignty by the Crown, and is inalienable other than by surrender to the Crown."
As a general rule, when the British Crown acquired a new colony, the land rights
of the inhabitants were presumed to continue in the absence of proof that the Crown
extinguished those rights by an act of state prior to or in the process of acquiring
sovereignty." Along with sovereignty, the Crown generally would have acquired
absolute title to vacant, unowned lands, as well as an underlying title to lands that were
subject to pre-existing rights." However, if Lamer C.J.C.'s time frame for proof of
other Aboriginal rights is applied to Aboriginal title, the time for determining the
existence of that title is not when the Crown acquired sovereignty, but when European
contact occurred. 58 Leaving aside the complicating factor of prior French sovereignty
in parts of Canada,59 and concentrating our discussion on the regions where the British
53 See Guerin, supra note 1 at 379-82, Dickson J. (as he then was); Borrows & Rotman, supra note 32
at 21.
5' See St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 58 (P.C.);
Canadian Pacific Limited v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 677. For more detailed discussion, see B.
Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 748-51; K. McNeil,
"The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Strait-jacket" in M. Bray & A. Thomson,
eds., Temagami: A Debate on Wilderness (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1990) 185, especially 189-91
[hereinafter "Loosening the Judicial Strait-jacket"] and "Racial Discrimination and Unilateral
Extinguishment of Native Title" (1996) 1 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 181 at 205-207
[hereinafter "Racial Discrimination"]. Compare Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993), 104 D.L.R.
(4th) 470, Macfarlane J.A. at 510-11, Wallace J.A. at 573, Lambert J.A. (dissenting on other grounds)
at 649-50, Hutcheon J.A. (dissenting on other grounds) at 755-56 [hereinafter Delgamuukw]. In fact,
Aboriginal title should enjoy more protection than other property interests because it has been
constitutionally recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, whereas other
property interests have not.
55 Guerin, supra note I at 376-82, Dickson J. On inalienability of Aboriginal title, see notes 76 and 112,
infra.
- See Witrong v. Blany, (1674) 3 Keb. 401 at 402; Amodu Tiani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, [1921]
2 A.C. 399 at 407, 410 (P.C.); Oyekan v. Adele, [1957] 2 All E.R. 785 at 788 (P.C.); and discussion
in Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35 at 161-92.
s' Mabo, supra note 35 at 43-52, Brennan J. Note, however, that the Crown probably would not have
acquired an underlying title to lands that were owned allodially, as on the Shetland and Orkney
Islands in Scotland: see Smith v. Lerwick Harbour Trustees (1903), 5 Sess. Cas. at 680 (Scot. CS),
especially 691; Lord Advocate v. Balfour, [1907] Sess. Cas. 1360, especially 1368 (Scot. CS). For
an argument that the nature of Mikmaw landholding prevented the Crown from acquiring underlying
title to lands in the Maritimes, see J.Y. Henderson, "Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada" (1995) 18
Dalhousie L.J. 196.
58 Note that in Adams, supra note 10 at 18 (para. 45), and C6td, supra note I I at 50 (para. 58), Lamer
C.J.C. seems to have qualified the time frame by saying that, in the regions in question, the time of
contact was "the arrival of Samuel de Champlain in 1603, when the French began to assume effective
control over the territories of New France" (C6tJ, ibid. (para. 58)). This implies that earlier European
contacts that did not result in actual colonization, such as Jacques Cartier's 1534-36 visits, would not
be appropriate times for applying the "integral to the distinctive culture" test.
5 Significantly, in Adams, ibid. at 13-14 (paras. 31-33), and C6tJ, ibid. at 43-49 (paras. 42-54), Lamer
C.J.C. held that the existence of Aboriginal rights in parts of Canada that were formerly New France
does not depend on whether or not the French law applicable there recognized those rights.
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Crown allegedly acquired sovereignty by settlement," ° this would be a striking
departure from judicial precedent and legal principle.61 If Aboriginal title is indeed an
interest in land, the relevant question should be whether that title existed when the
Crown effectively acquired sovereignty, 62 because it is at that moment that it must be
determined whether the Crown acquired an absolute or merely an underlying title.
We therefore need to ask whether Lamer C.J.C.'s explanation for using time of
contact justifies application of that time frame to Aboriginal title. We have seen that
he said courts must look to the pre-contact period in identifying Aboriginal rights
"[b]ecause it is the fact that distinctive Aboriginal societies lived on the land prior to
the arrival of Europeans that underlies the Aboriginal rights protected by s.35(1).63
He continued:
The fact that the doctrine of Aboriginal rights functions to reconcile the existence of pre-
existing Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown does not alter this position.
Although it is the sovereignty of the Crown that the pre-existing Aboriginal societies are
being reconciled with, it is to those pre-existing societies that the court must look in defining
Aboriginal rights. It is not the fact that Aboriginal societies existed prior to Crown
sovereignty that is relevant; it is the fact that they existed prior to the arrival of Europeans
in North America. As such, the relevant time period is the period prior to the arrival of
Europeans, not the period prior to the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown.M
With all due respect, these passages declare that the pre-contact period applies without
really explaining why. The fact is that the Aboriginal peoples lived on the land as pre-
existing societies at the time of acquisition of sovereignty as well as prior to contact.
0 Settlement is the way an original title to territory could be acquired in British Imperial law, and can
be contrasted with conquest and cession, which were ways of acquiring a derivative title: see
generally Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35 at 108-33. On the parts of Canada that were
allegedly acquired by the Crown by settlement, see ibid. at 267-69. For a critique of the applicability
of the settlement concept to territories that were occupied by Aboriginal peoples, see M. Asch & P.
Macklem, "Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow' (1991) 29 Alta.
L. Rev. 498.
61 See Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35, where an examination of various former British
colonies revealed that in places as diverse as Ireland, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Sierra Leone, India,
British Honduras (Belize), Pitcairn Island and elsewhere the inhabitants who either had land rights
under local law or were in occupation of lands at the time the Crown acquired sovereignty had title
to those lands as against the Crown. Australia has since been added to this list by the decision of the
High Court in Mabo, supra note 35.
62 The time when the Crown acquired sovereignty is a matter of debate in some parts of Canada: e.g.
see K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Nations and Quebec's Boundaries: Canada Couldn't Give What It Didn't
Have" in D. Drache & R. Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Quebec (Toronto: Lorimer, 1992)
107; M.L. Ng, Convenient Illusions: A Consideration of Sovereignty and the Aboriginal Right of Self-
Government (LL.M. Thesis, York University, 1994) at 2-69.
63 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 205 (para. 60).
6 Ibid. at 205 (para. 61) [emphasis in original]. Note that, on the same page (para. 62), Lamer C.J.C.
went on to caution courts against applying impossible standards of proof of pre-contact practices,
customs and traditions: "The evidence relied upon by the applicant and the courts may relate to
Aboriginal practices, customs and traditions post-contact; it simply needs to be directed at
demonstrating which aspects of the Aboriginal community and society have their origins pre-contact."
See also Adams, supra note 10 at 18-19 (para. 46).
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Prior to acquisition of sovereignty, the common law would not have applied and the
Crown would have had no rights in North America. So why is pre-contact, and not the
time of acquisition of sovereignty, the relevant period?
For the answer to this question, one must look elsewhere in Lamer C.J.C.'s
judgment in Van der Peet. In the introduction to his analysis, he said this:
The task of this Court is to define Aboriginal rights in a manner which recognizes that
Aboriginal rights are rights but which does so without losing sight of the fact that they are
rights held by Aboriginal people because they are Aboriginal. The Court must neither lose
sight of the generalized constitutional status of what s.35(I) protects, nor can it ignore the
necessary specificity which comes from granting special constitutional protection to one part
of Canadian society. The Court must define the scope of s.35(1) in a way which captures
both the Aboriginal and the rights in Aboriginal rights.65
Lamer C.J.C. was obviously concerned about one segment of Canadian society
having constitutional protection for rights not enjoyed by all Canadians.66 In my
opinion, this concern prompted him to limit those rights as much as possible, and one
way of accomplishing that was to define those rights in terms of pre-contact practices,
customs and traditions. In doing so, he adopted a narrow, time-orientated conception
of what "Aboriginal" means in the context of s. 35(1), so that it includes only those
aspects of Aboriginal societies that pre-dated and therefore did not arise as a result of
contact with Europeans. " He wrote:
If the practice, custom or tradition was an integral part of the Aboriginal community's culture
prior to contact with Europeans, the fact that that practice, custom or tradition continued after
the arrival of Europeans, and adapted in response to their arrival, is not relevant to
determination of the claim; European arrival and influence cannot be used to deprive an
Aboriginal group of an otherwise valid claim to an Aboriginal right. On the other hand,
where the practice, custom or tradition arose solely as a response to European influences then
that practice, custom or tradition will not meet the standard for recognition of an Aboriginal
right.6"
65 Van der Peet, ibid. at 190 (para. 20) [emphasis in original].
66 For answers to this concern, see P. Macklem, "Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality
of Peoples" (1993) 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1311.
67 One has to wonder how this definition takes account of Aboriginal perspectives, as it should
according to Lamer C.J.C.'s own directions: see text accompanying notes 22-24, supra. I doubt that
any Aboriginal people would accept a static, historically-based conception of what "Aboriginal"
means: for one Aboriginal perspective on this, see Borrows, supra note 7, especially at 28-29.
Moreover, in Sparrow, supra note 30, Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J. said in reference to s. 35(1)
that "it is clear that a generous, liberal interpretation of the words in the constitutional provision is
demanded." Lamer C.J.C. quoted and emphasized these words in Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 191
(para. 23), and added at 192 (para. 25): "The fiduciary relationship of the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples also means that where there is any doubt or ambiguity with regards to what falls within the
scope and definition of s. 35(1), such doubt or ambiguity must be resolved in favour of Aboriginal
peoples." Where is the generous, liberal interpretation, and how is doubt or ambiguity resolved in
favour of Aboriginal peoples, in Lamer C.J.C.'s definition of "Aboriginal"?
68 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 209-10 (para. 73).
For Lamer C.J.C., adaptions made to deal with the changing circumstances which
necessarily resulted from the arrival of Europeans in North America would only be
Aboriginal if there was sufficient continuity with pre-contact practices, customs and
traditions.69 However, he did not specify the extent to which adaptions could be made
without losing the requisite continuity.
So how might the pre-contact time frame for the existence of Aboriginal rights
be applied to Aboriginal title? Apparently, it would have to be shown that, prior to
European contact, the Aboriginal people in question occupied and used the claimed land
in ways sufficient to establish title to the land."° If their occupation and use of that
land arose post-contact as a result of European influences, whether before or after
acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown, they might not have Aboriginal title.
7
Moreover, Aboriginal title might also be denied them if they used the lands pre-contact,
but their occupation and use only became sufficient for Aboriginal title as a result of
European influences. In that situation, the validity of their claim would seem to depend
on whether there was adequate continuity between their pre- and post-contact uses. If
not, then according to Lamer C.J.C.'s conception of "Aboriginal," their occupation and
use would not meet the Aboriginal aspect of Aboriginal title.
In my view, it makes no sense to deny Aboriginal people title because they
happened to shift their occupation and use of land from one area to another as a result
of European influences, at least if that occurred prior to acquisition of Crown
sovereignty.72 The Crown would have no right whatsoever to those lands prior to
acquisition of sovereignty, and could not have prevented the Aboriginal people from
acquiring a valid title by occupation and use. Nor would that occupation and use be any
less "Aboriginal" just because it resulted from European contact, as the Aboriginal
people would have made the move of their own volition and in accordance with their
own needs, prior to any European assertion of control or jurisdiction over them.
Moreover, while the arrival of Europeans in North America did cause significant
Aboriginal population shifts,73 those relocations were generally ignored by the
representatives of the Crown when they signed land surrender treaties with the
Aboriginal peoples.74 Attempting to ascertain whether the Aboriginal participants in
the treaty process had been in occupation at the time of contact would have made the
69 Ibid. at 206 (para. 64).
0 See text accompanying notes 37-47, supra.
71 See text accompanying note 19, supra.
72 Recall that Lamer C.J.C. touched on this issue and left it undecided in Adams, supra note 10 at 12
(para. 28): see text accompanying note 19, supra.
7' E.g. see D.G. Mandelbaum, The Plains Cree: An Ethnographic, Historical and Comparative Study
(Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina, 1979) at 15-49; H. Hornbeck
Tanner, ed., Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History (4orman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987);
R.C. Harris, ed., Historical Atlas of Canada, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987),
especially Plates 33, 35, 69.
7' The treaty commissioners entered into the treaties with the Aboriginal peoples who were in
occupation at the time, without inquiring whether they had been there prior to European contact or
even Crown sovereignty: e.g. see A. Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba
and the North-West Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke and Co., 1880) [hereinafter The Treaties
of Canada].
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process unworkable.75 Further, if one Aboriginal group had title and subsequently
transferred it to or was displaced by another group, the latter group should have
acquired an Aboriginal title of its own, even if that occurred after contact or acquisition
of Crown sovereignty.76
Where an Aboriginal people's use of specific land only became sufficient for
them to have the occupation necessary for Aboriginal title as a result of European
influences (if that ever happened77 ), I still think that Lamer C.J.C.'s time frame for
establishing Aboriginal rights would be inapplicable to their Aboriginal title claim. As
discussed above, where an interest in land is concerned the time for determining the
existence of that interest as against the Crown is the moment of acquisition of
sovereignty.78 Where an Aboriginal people occupied and used specific lands at that
time (whether as a result of European influences or not), then in accordance with
common law principles and authorities their occupation and use would give them an
interest in those lands and prevent the Crown from acquiring more than an underlying
title.79 To deny that interest in situations where their occupation was influenced by
European contact and therefore not "Aboriginal" would be to disregard established legal
doctrine and rely instead on a questionable, time-orientated judicial conception of
Aboriginality. In my opinion, that would overlook both the common law and Aboriginal
perspectives that Lamer C.J.C. said have to be taken into account in identifying
Aboriginal rights, and would not be an appropriate way to develop the jurisprudence
necessary to clarify the law of Aboriginal title.
75 See B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title, (Studies in
Aboriginal Rights No. 2), (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983) at 34-
35.
76 See Slattery, supra note 54 at 741-43; The Queen v. Symonds (1847), [1840-1932] N.Z.P.C.C. 387
at 391, Chapman J. American courts have accepted that Indian title could be acquired after
acquisition of sovereignty by a European power or the United States. In Sac and Fox Tribe, supra
note 47 at 998-99, Skelton J. wrote:
It is a matter of common knowledge that in the course of years, and especially during the
early years of the United States, the use and occupancy of land by Indian tribes changed
continuously. New tribes would appear and old ones would disappear or move on to new
territories. Sometimes land of one tribe would be exchanged for that of another, or one tribe
would acquire the land of another as the result of an Indian war or by right of conquest....
It would not be in accordance with facts nor history to freeze all Indian titles as of the date
of the discovery of America, nor with our own Declaration of Independence in 1776. We
know that there was considerable change in such titles after these dates. Consequently, it is
not possible to fix any cutoff date for the establishment of Indian title, except the date the
Indians lose the land through treaty or otherwise.
See also Turtle Mountain Band v. United States, 490 F. 2d 935 at 941-42 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1974)
[hereinafter Turtle Mountain Band].
77 In my view, it is very doubtful that any Aboriginal people lacked the requisite degree of occupation
and use for them to have Aboriginal title prior to contact: see text accompanying notes 37-47, supra.
78 See text accompanying notes 56-62, supra.
79 For detailed discussion, see Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35, especially 205-21.
B. CONTENT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
In our discussion so far, we have seen that the Supreme Court has intimated that
it will apply the "integral to the distinctive culture" test to an Aboriginal title claim to
determine whether the claimants' connection with the land was sufficient to make out
their claim of title."0 However, the way the test might be applied in that context
remains uncertain. Moreover, it is unclear whether the test will only apply to the issue
of the existence of Aboriginal title, or whether it will also be used to define the title's
content once its existence has been established. In my opinion, if the test is applied to
an Aboriginal title claim its application should be limited to the first issue - it should
not be used to define the content of an established Aboriginal title.
The content of Aboriginal title should be determined by the fact that the
Aboriginal people in question were in occupation of the land as a distinctive society at
the relevant time,"' not by the specific uses the) happened to be making of the land
at that particular historical moment. 2 As discussed above, those uses are relevant to
determining whether the Aboriginal people were in occupation, but that is as far as their
relevance extends.
Taking the perspectives of the Aboriginal peoples into account, as Lamer C.J.C.
said we must, 3 I think it is safe to assume that no Aboriginal people would ever have
regarded their entitlement to land as limited to the uses they made of it at a particular
time. 4 Every society changes and adapts as new circumstances arise and technological
innovations are made, and changes in land use are inevitably a part of this dynamic
process. Societies that are unwilling or unable to adapt are unlikely to survive. Denying
Aboriginal peoples the opportunity to change their land uses in response to the massive
impact European colonization had on their ways of life would have condemned their
societies to extinction. Moreover, government policy in Canada encouraged the
Aboriginal peoples to change their uses of the land so that they would continue to be
self-sufficient. As Professor Brian Slattery has written, when officials urged certain
Aboriginal groups to abandon their traditional ways of life and "to take up farming,
they were not sanctioning an unlawful user of land."85
So taking into account Aboriginal perspectives, the dynamic nature of human
societies, and government policy, an approach that limits the content of Aboriginal title
80 See especially text accompanying note 14, supra.
8' See discussion in text accompanying notes 48-79, supra, on the appropriate time frame.
82 Compare Delgamuukw, supra note 54. For critical commentary on the aspect of the decision relating
to the content of Aboriginal title, see K. McNeil, "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title" in M. Asch, ed.,
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality and Respect for Difference
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997) 135 [hereinafter "The Meaning of
Aboriginal Title"].
83 See text accompanying notes 22-24, supra.
" Moreover, whether one adopts European contact, Crown acquisition of sovereignty, or some other
historical moment as the relevant time, from an Aboriginal perspective it would no doubt be arbitrary.
85 Slattery, supra note 54 at 747. Slattery, of course, was referring to Aboriginal peoples who did not
engage in agriculture prior to European colonization.
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to land uses at some precise historical moment appears to be fundamentally flawed.
Professor Slattery made this point vividly when he wrote that, on the supposition that
Aboriginal title is limited to customary practices followed at some distant historical
period,
aboriginal title is like an historical diorama in a museum. Here a smiling native strips birch-
bark from a tree, there a warrior aims bow and arrow at a mildewed deer, while in the comer
a youngster plucks plastic blueberries from a withered bush. We must, of course, disregard
the next display, where Indians under the stem but kindly eye of a black-robed missionary
plant their first crop of com. Agriculture, if not practiced aboriginally, is forbidden. The
difficulty with this conception, of course, is that native people are not waxen figures on
display for tourists, but living people who depend on the land for their livelihood. Any rule
that would hold them in permanent bondage to ancient practices must be regarded with
scepticism. '8
In addition, limiting the content of Aboriginal title to past uses violates common
law principles and accepted norms of non-discrimination, and conflicts with established
judicial precedents.
1. Common Law Principles and Non-Discrimination
In the common law, possession is the root of all titles to land.87 Even the
Crown's title in England, which by a legal fiction is deemed to have preceded all other
land titles, is taken to have arisen from the Crown's supposed possession of the whole
realm as "universal occupant." 88 Possession is established by proof of occupation,
which depends on evidence of sufficient acts of use and control in relation to the
land. 9 Invariably, evidence of use relates solely to the issue of whether the person
claiming title has the requisite possession. Once possession has been established the
possessor has a title, the nature of which is in no way dependent on the acts of use
relied on to prove it.90
A title rooted in possession entitles the possessor to an interest in the land. The
kind of interest acquired depends on the nature of the interest available for acquisition
at the time possession was taken. In a hypothetical situation where the land was
16 Ibid. at 746.
87 The King v. Lord Yarborough (1828), 2 Bli. (N.S.) 147 at 159. See generally Common Law
Aboriginal Title, supra note 35 at 6-78.
8' M. Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law, vol. 8 (Philadelphia: T & J.W. Johnson, 1854) at 13. See
also Anonymous, Considerations on the Law of Forfeiture, for High Treason, 4th ed. (London: J.
Williams, 1775) 64-65; J. Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown (London:
Joseph Butterworth and Son, 1820) 211; W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol.
2, 16th ed. (London: T. Cadell and J. Butterworth and Son, 1825) at 51.
89 See works cited in note 41, supra.
'o See authorities cited in notes 42-44, supra.
unowned by anyone,9 the possessor would have acquired the greatest interest possible,
which in the common law system of estates is a fee simple interest.92 Where an estate
pur autre vie became vacant as a result of the death of the life tenant prior to the death
of the cestui que vie, at common law the first person to take possession would have
acquired the pur autre vie estate as occupant.93 Where a disseisor or adverse possessor
wrongfully took possession, whether from a leaseholder or freeholder, the possessor
would have acquired a fee simple, albeit tortious." In each of these circumstances, the
nature of the interest acquired depends on circumstances which have nothing to do with
the nature of the acts in relation to the land that would have been relied upon to
establish the possession. Once that interest has been acquired, the possessor is entitled
to put the land to any use, subject to relevant common law limitations such as those
imposed by the law of nuisance, and to legislative restraints created by zoning laws,
building codes, and the like. Moreover, as possession of the surface also entails
possession of the subsurface (unless someone else has possession thereof),9" the
possessor would generally be entitled to mineral rights.96
So from a common law perspective, sufficient evidence of occupation and use
will establish an entitlement to an interest in land, just as sufficient evidence of
occupation and use will establish an entitlement to Aboriginal title. At common law,
an interest acquired by possession is not limited to the uses relied upon to establish the
possession. So is there any reason why Aboriginal title should be so limited? Taking
the Aboriginal perspective into account would be unlikely to provide such a reason, as
no doubt Aboriginal people generally would not think that their entitlement to use the
land would ever have been limited to the uses they happened to make of it at any
particular time. Like possessors of land in England, they would probably think that,
91 I say "hypothetical" because the common law doctrine of tenures probably makes it impossible for
land to be unowned, as in the absence of a fee simple or other tenancy, the land will be deemed to
be owned by the Crown. However, mere lack of proof of a tenancy is not sufficient for the Crown
to have a valid claim: see Bristow v. Cormican, supra note 43.
9' This may have occurred in British Honduras (now Belize) and on Pitcairn Island: see Common Law
Aboriginal Title, supra note 35 at 141-57.
93 See Blackstone, supra note 88, vol. 2 at 259-60; Bacon, supra note 88, "Estate for Life and
Occupancy" B.1; H.W. Challis, The Law of Real Property (London: Reeves and Turner, 1885) at
287-89.
9' See Leigh v. Hudson (1565), 2 Dyer 238b; Elvis v. Archbishop of York (1619), Hob. 315 at 323;
Wheeler v. Baldwin (1934), 52 C.L.R. 609 at 632 (H.C. Aust.). However, there may be an exception
where the person dispossessed was a leaseholder and the dispossessor claimed the leasehold rather
than the fee simple: see Mayor of Norwich v. Johnson (1681), 3 Lev. 35.
" See Lewis v. Branthwaite (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 437; Keyse v. Powell (1853), 2 El. & BI. 132 at 144-
45. In Rowbotham v. Wilson (1860), 8 H.L.C. 348 at 360, Lord Wensleydale said that "prima facie
the owner of the surface is entitled to the surface itself and all below exjure naturae."
However, in the case of a pur autre vie estate acquired by occupancy, the law of waste would have
prevented the occupant from opening new mines: see Worcester's Case (1605), 6 Co. Rep. 37a;
Campbell v. Wardlaw (1883), 8 App. Cas. 641 (H.L.); Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 42, 4th ed.
(London: Butterworths, 1983) at 530 (para. 993).
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subject to their own customary laws,97 they could make any use of it that met their
current needs and aspirations.
It will be recalled that in Van der Peet Lamer C.J.C. said that Aboriginal rights
should be defined "in a manner which recognizes that Aboriginal rights are rights but
which does so without losing sight of the fact that they are rights held by Aboriginal
people because they are Aboriginal.""g In my view, this Aboriginal aspect would be
fulfilled in the context of Aboriginal title by a requirement that the occupation and use
relied on to establish the title involved a connection with the land that was integral to
the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal people in question. This approach would be
consistent with the common law principles discussed above, and take account of the
Aboriginal perspective, but it would also give coherence to the development of the law
of Aboriginal rights. Adams and C6tg contributed to this development by informing us
that free-standing rights such as a right to hunt or fish can exist independently of
Aboriginal title. This must mean that free-standing rights and Aboriginal title are
conceptually different. The distinction that appears from Adams in particular is that
free-standing rights involve activities on the land that are integral to the Aboriginal
people's distinctive culture, whereas Aboriginal title involves a connection with the land
itself that meets the integral test. Aboriginal title therefore must be more than a
collection of rights to pursue activities on the land that could exist separately as free-
standing rights. Like a title acquired by possession at common law, it entails an interest
in land that is not limited to specific uses, but rather entitles the Aboriginal title holders
to use the land in ways that meet their current needs and aspirations. They would
therefore be able to practice agriculture, engage in lumbering, extract minerals, and so
on, regardless of whether they had done so in the past.
This analysis of the content of Aboriginal title conforms with accepted standards
of non-discrimination because it accords Aboriginal peoples an interest in land based
on their occupation and use that is equivalent to the interest accorded to non-Aboriginal
people on the same basis. While Aboriginal title probably is not the same as a fee
simple estate,99 it is equivalent in the sense that it is perpetual, enduring for as long
as the Aboriginal people in question continue to exist, or until it is surrendered to the
Crown or otherwise validly extinguished. 0 If the uses Aboriginal people can make
9 Like common law and statute law, those laws would not be fixed at any particular point in time, but
could and would change to meet the changing circumstances encountered by their societies. In Hineiti
Rirerire Arani v. Public Trustee, [1920] A.C. 198 at 204-205 (P.C.) and Mabo, supra note 35 at 61,
Brennan J., at 110, Deane and Gaudron JJ., it was accepted that changes in the customary law of
indigenous peoples might occur even after the Crown acquired sovereignty over their territories.
98 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 190 (para. 20).
9 See Guerin, supra note 1. As Dickson J. said in that case at 382, what makes Aboriginal title unique
is that it is inalienable except by surrender to the Crown, and that upon surrender there is a fiduciary
duty on the Crown to deal with the land on behalf of the Aboriginal people who executed the
surrender. While those features led Dickson J. to describe Aboriginal title as sui generis, they do not
relate to and should not detract from the content of that title: see "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title,"
supra note 82 at 142-44, and note 112, infra.
00 Note that Aboriginal title could be extinguished by clear and plain federal legislation prior to the
enactment of s. 35(t) of the Constitution Act, 1982, but since then that is no longer possible: see
Sparrow, supra note 30 at 174-75; Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 193 (para. 28).
of their land are limited to historic uses while the uses a fee simple tenant can make
are not, that is discriminatory. This is vividly illustrated in a situation where an adverse
possessor wrongfully takes possession of someone else's land and remains there for the
statutory limitation period, which in some Canadian provinces is only ten years. That
wrongdoer will have a fee simple estate acquired through possession, ' entitling him
or her to make any use of the land permitted by law, regardless of the nature of the acts
relied on to establish the adverse possession. Moreover, those acts may be no different
from, and could even be less extensive than, acts of use relied on to establish
Aboriginal title.'0 2 Any legal system that would accord a greater interest in land to
a wrongdoer, after just ten years adverse possession, than it would to Aboriginal
peoples who have rightfully occupied and used lands for hundreds or even thousands
of years, is not entitled to respect. As the Supreme Court has rejected the application
of discriminatory doctrines where the existence of Aboriginal title is concerned, 3 one
would expect it to take a non-discriminatory approach to the issue of the content of
Aboriginal title as well. There are indications in the case law, supported by decisions
in other jurisdictions, that the Court will take such an approach.
2. Judicial Precedents
In Australia, the leading case of Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] established that
Native title (as Aboriginal title, with an important distinction to be discussed below, is
generally called there) is an interest in land recognized by the common law from the
time of acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown.0 4 The case involved a claim to an
existing Native title by the Meriam people, an indigenous community inhabiting the
Murray Islands in the Torres Strait off Cape York in northern Queensland. Writing the
principal majority judgment, Brennan J. said this about the source and nature of Native
title generally:
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by
and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature
1o1 The adverse possessor's title arises from his or her possession, not from a legislative conveyance,
because all the statute does is extinguish the rights and title of the dispossessed fee simple tenant
when the limitation period expires, thereby making the wrongdoer's title unchallengeable: see
Tichborne v. Weir (1892), 67 L.T. 735; In re Atkinson and Horsell's Contract, [1912] 2 Ch. 1 at 9,
17; Fairweather v. St. Marylebone Property Co., [1963] A.C. 510, especially 535 (H.L.).
102 E.g. see Kirby, supra note 42 (payment of taxes on "wild" land with no actual occupation or use);
Cadyia Umma, supra note 44 (cutting wild grass); Red House Farms, supra note 43 (hunting: see text
accompanying note 43, supra).
0 See C6tM, supra note 11 at 48-49 (para. 53), where Lamer CIC. said that acceptance of the argument
that no Aboriginal rights exist in the parts of Canada originally colonized by France would risk
"undermining the very purpose of s. 35(l) [of the Constitution Act, 1982] by perpetuating the
historical injustice suffered by Aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect
the distinctive cultures of pre-existing Aboriginal societies." He supported his reasons for rejecting
this argument by quoting the following passage from Brennan J.'sjudgment in Mabo, supra note 35
at 42: "Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognize the rights and
interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and discriminatory
doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted."
Mabo, ibid., especially per Brennan J. at 38-52, Toohey J. at 180-92, 205-14; compare per Deane and
Gaudron JJ. at 81-95, 109-10.
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and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to those laws
and customs."0 5
In Van der Peet, Lamer C.J.C. quoted this passage and commented as follows:
This position is the same as that being adopted here. "Tiraditional laws" and "traditional
customs" are those things passed down, and arising, from the pre-existing culture and
customs of Aboriginal peoples.... To base Aboriginal title in traditional laws and customs,
as was done in Mabo, is, therefore, to base that title in the pre-existing societies of
Aboriginal peoples. This is the same basis as that asserted here for Aboriginal rights."
Taken alone, the above passage from Brennan J.'sjudgment and Lamer C.J.C.'s
comments on it could leave the impression that traditional laws and customs are all that
matter where the source and content of Native or Aboriginal title are concerned.
However, Lamer C.J.C. linked both the identification and definition of Aboriginal
rights, including Aboriginal title, to occupation of land." 7 In Mabo, a similar kind of
dual approach to Native title is apparent. Brennan J. wrote:
If it be necessary to categorize an interest in land as proprietary in order that it survive a
change in sovereignty, the interest possessed by a community that is in exclusive possession
of land falls into that category. Whether or not land is owned by individual members of a
community, a community which asserts and asserts effectively that none but its members has
any right to occupy or use the land has an interest in the land that must be proprietary in
nature: there is no other proprietor.... The ownership of land within a territory in the
exclusive occupation of a people must be vested in that people: land is susceptible of
ownership, and there are no other owners."0
What then is the relationship between this proprietary interest arising from
exclusive occupation and the traditional laws and customs of the community? Brennan
J. provided some clarification of this relationship in the following passage:
Where a proprietary title capable of recognition by the common law is found to have been
possessed by a community in occupation of a territory, there is no reason why that title
should not be recognized as a burden on the Crown's radical title when the Crown acquires
sovereignty over that territory. The fact that individual members of the community ... enjoy
only usufructuary rights that are not proprietary in nature is no impediment to the recognition
of a proprietary community title.... That being so, there is no impediment to the recognition
of individual non-proprietary rights that are derived from the community's laws and customs
and are dependent on the community title. A fortiori, there can be no impediment to the
recognition of individual proprietary rights."
05 Ibid. at 58; see also per Deane and Gaudron JJ. at 87-88, 110; compare per Toohey J., especially at
187-92.
'o6 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 198 (para. 40).
107 Ibid. at 210 (para. 74): see text accompanying note 15, supra.
1"8 Mabo, supra note 35 at 51; see also per Deane and Gaudron JJ. at 86, Toohey J. at 184-92, 194-95,
207-14.
'o9 Ibid. at 51-52.
The composite picture that emerges from Brennan J.'s judgment is of an
indigenous community, with laws and customs governing land rights and interests, that
was in exclusive occupation of a territory at the time the Crown acquired sovereignty.
Regardless of the nature of the rights and interests stemming from those internal laws
and customs, as against the Crown, the community's exclusive occupation of the
territory would have given it a proprietary title akin to ownership. Upon acquisition of
sovereignty, the common law would have given the Crown a radical title, but in those
circumstances this underlying title would be "merely a logical postulate required to
support the doctrine of tenure ... and to support the plenary title of the Crown" when
the Native title was validly extinguished. "0
So where an indigenous community was in exclusive occupation,"' its title
would arise from that occupation, and would be much the same as ownership, which
must mean that it is equivalent to a fee simple."2 Traditional laws and customs would
apply internally to determine the nature of the rights and interests of members of the
"0 Ibid. at 50; see also per Deane and Gaudron JJ. at 80-81, 86-87, Toohey J. at 180-82.
The exclusivity aspect does not mean that two or more indigenous communities could not be co-
owners, as long as they were not disputing the occupation. In the United States, it has been held that
two or more Indian groups who jointly and amicably occupied the same lands to the exclusion of
others would have original Indian title: see Turtle Mountain Band, supra note 76 at 944; United
States v. Pueblo of San ldefonso, 513 F. 2d 1383 at 1394-95 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1975); Strong v. United
States, 518 F. 2d 556 at 561-62 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1015 (1975). Referring to
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., supra note 47 at 345, Toohey J., in his concurring
judgment in Mabo, supra note 35 at 189-90, said this:
This principle of exclusive occupancy is justified in so far as it precludes indiscriminate
ranging over land but it is difficult to see the basis for the rule if it precludes title merely
on the ground that more than one group utilizes land. Either each smaller group could be
said to have title, comprising the right to shared use of land in accordance with traditional
use; or traditional title vests in the larger "society" comprising all the rightful occupiers.
12 See also Mabo, ibid. at 75, where Brennan J. observed:
As the Crown holds the radical title to the Murray Islands and as native title is not a title
created by grant nor is it a common law tenure, it may be confusing to describe the title of
the Meriam people as conferring "ownership," a term which connotes an estate in fee simple
or at least an estate of freehold. Nevertheless, it is right to say that their native title is
effective as against the State of Queensland and as against the whole world unless the State,
in valid exercise of its legislative or executive power, extinguishes the title.
See also per Toohey J. at 207-14, especially his conclusion at 214 that it would be "no more
beneficial for the plaintiffs" to have possessory title to a fee simple estate than to have traditional
title (as he called Native title); ergo, Native title is just as good as a fee simple (this is confirmed
at 216 by his description of the traditional title of the Meriam people to the Murray Islands as
"their rights to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the Islands..."). While it is true that
Native title, unlike most estates in fee simple, is inalienable other than by surrender to the Crown,
Brennan J. wrote at 51 that "[i]t would be wrong, in my opinion, to point to the inalienability of
land by that [an indigenous] community and, by importing definitions of 'property' which require
alienability under the municipal law of our society, to deny that the indigenous people owned their
land" [footnote omitted]. Compare per Deane and Gaudron JJ. at 88-90, critiqued in "Racial
Discrimination," supra note 54 at 204-208. See also United States v. Paine Lumber Company, 206
U.S. 467 at 473 (1907), where McKenna J., delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court, said in reference to Indian title: "The restraint upon alienation must not be exaggerated. It
does not of itself debase the right below a fee simple." For discussion of the issue of inalienability,
and for authority that not all fee simple estates are alienable, see Common Law Aboriginal Title,
supra note 35 at 221-35.
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community, which may or may not be proprietary, but would not operate externally to
define or limit the community's title as against the Crown or third parties.113 That this
is what Brennan J. meant when he said that Native title is given its content by
traditional laws and customs is apparent from his acceptance of the dynamic nature of
indigenous legal systems. He wrote:
Of course in time the laws and customs of any people will change and the rights and interests
of the members of the people among themselves will change too. But so long as the people
remain as an identifiable community, the members of whom are identified by one another
as members of that community living under its laws and customs, the communal native title
survives to be enjoyed by the members according to the rights and interests to which they are
respectively entitled under the traditionally based laws and customs, as currently
acknowledged and observed." 4
From this passage, it appears that the communal Native title will be maintained by the
continuance of an identifiable community and remain constant, regardless of changes
to rights and interests within the community made by modifications to the traditional
laws and customs. If the nature of Native title itself could be altered by modifications
to those laws and customs, the radical title of the Crown would be affected as well. As
Brennan J. upheld the sovereignty of the Crown and its authority to extinguish Native
title,"5 he could not have intended to recognize a contravening power permitting
indigenous communities to modify the Crown's underlying title.
The interpretation of Brennan J.'s judgment presented above is also consistent
with the formal order the High Court made in Mabo - indeed, if the nature of the
Meriam people's title as against the Crown really depended on their traditional laws and
customs, the order would make no sense. That order, which in this respect corresponds
with the declaration Brennan J. proposed, declared in part "that the Meriam people are
entitled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the
lands of the Murray Islands.""' 6 Significantly, the order, which was a declaration of
"the native communal title of the Meriam people,""' 7 was made even though
Moynihan J., the finder of fact in the case, had found no such communal title in
Meriam law or custom. According to Brennan J., Moynihan J. had "found that there
was apparently no concept of public or general community ownership among the people
of Murray Island, all the land of Murray Island being regarded as belonging to
individuals or groups.""' 8 So the communal native title of the Meriam people which
13 However, the existence of those laws and customs would probably support the assertion of the
indigenous people that they were in occupation as a community: see quotation accompanying note
108, supra. See also Mabo, ibid. per Toohey J., especially 187-92, 206-14, 216.
1"4 Ibid. at 61 [emphasis added]; see also per Deane and Gaudron JJ. at 110, Toohey J. at 192.
.. Ibid. at 31-34, 63-71. For a critique of Brennan J.'s position on extinguishment, see "Racial
Discrimination," supra note 54 at 190-203.
116 Mabo, ibid. at 217 [emphasis omitted].
"7 Ibid. at 75, Brennan J.
... Ibid. at 22, Brennan J. See also per Toohey J. at 191, where he observed that "the findings of
Moynihan J. do not allow the articulation of a precise set of rules," but went on to conclude that that
did not matter because "the particular nature of the rules which govern a society or which describe
the High Court declared to exist must have originated and derived its content from their
exclusive occupation as a community of the Murray Islands, not from their traditional
laws or customs. "9 Those laws and customs would nonetheless be applicable to
determine the existence and content of individual and group rights within the Meriam
community. 2 °
The High Court returned to the issue of Native title recently in Wik Peoples v.
Queensland,'2' where it decided by a majority of four to three that Crown grants of
pastoral leases did not necessarily extinguish Native title in Australia.'22 The majority
nonetheless rejected the argument that extinguishment will only occur when there is
factual inconsistency between the use a grantee actually makes of the land and the
exercise of the Native title rights, and held instead that inconsistency between their
legal rights will extinguish, or suspend, the Native title to the extent of the
inconsistency.'23 The majority concluded that it could not decide whether legal
inconsistency existed between the pastoral leases in question and the Native title
claimed by the Wik and Thayorre peoples in the case, as the existence of that title and
the extent of the rights entailed by it had not yet been determined by the trial
judge.124
However, if Native title amounts to an interest akin to ownership which is
equivalent to a fee simple, as Brennan J. apparently concluded in Mabo, then it would
include a right of exclusive possession. As we have seen, the High Court in that case
declared that the Native title of the Meriam people entitles them to possession as
against the whole world,'25 which means they have a right of exclusive possession.
As such a right would no doubt be inconsistent with the rights of pastoral leaseholders,
the majority's decision in Wik depends on an assumption that the content of Native title
is not necessarily equivalent to a fee simple, and can vary from one indigenous group
to another.
its members' relationship with land does not determine the question of traditional land rights."
.. Toohey J.'sjudgment contains the clearest articulation of this basis for the declaration in the order:
ibid. at 188-92.
20 Two of the plaintiffs had originally claimed individual or group rights to specific lands on the Islands,
but as the factual findings were not sufficient and the action was not constituted in a way that would
have permitted the granting of declaratory relief with respect to those claims, "[tlhe plaintiffs'
statement of claim was then amended to seek declarations relating to the title of the Meriam people":
ibid. at 75, Brennan J.
.2 Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 (H.C. Aust.) [hereinafter Wik].
122 For commentary, see R.H. Bartlett, "The Fundamental Significance of Wik v. State of Queensland
in the High Court of Australia" [1997] 2 C.N.L.R. 1; K. McNeil, "Co-Existence of Indigenous Rights
and Other Interests in Land in Australia and Canada" [1997] 3 C.N.L.R. I [hereinafter "Co-Existence
of Indigenous Rights"]; and collections of articles in (1997) 4:1 Indigenous Law Bulletin, Special Wik
Issue, and (1997) 3:2 University of New South Wales Law Journal FORUM, "Wik: The Aftermath
and Implications."
123 See Wik, supra note 121 at 185, Toohey J.; at 193, Gaudron J.; at 233, Gummow J.; at 262, 273-75,
279, Kirby J.; and commentary in "Co-Existence of Indigenous Rights," ibid The majority left the
issue of whether Native title could be suspended for the duration of an inconsistent interest open: see
at 188, Toohey J.; at 248, Gummow J.; at 279-86, Kirby J.
24 Ibid., per Toohey J. at 188-90, Gaudron J. at 218-19, Gummow J. at 220-22, Kirby J. at 285-86.
125 See text accompanying note 116, supra.
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Toohey J., whose general conclusions were accepted by the other majority judges
in Wik,'26 was explicit in this regard. Quoting from Deane and Gaudron JJ. and his
own judgment in Mabo, as well as from Lamer C.J.C.'s judgment in Van der Peet, he
wrote:
Inconsistency can only be determined, in the present context, by identifying what native title
rights in the system of rights and interests upon which the appellants [the Wik and Thayorre
peoples] rely are asserted in relation to the land contained in the pastoral leases. This cannot
be done by some general statement; it must "focus specifically on the traditions, customs and
practices of the particular Aboriginal group claiming the right". 32 Those rights are then
measured against the rights conferred on the grantees of the pastoral leases; to the extent of
any inconsistency the latter prevail. It is apparent that at one end of the spectrum native title
rights may "approach the rights flowing from fill ownership at common law". 33 On the other
hand they may be an entitlement "to come on to land for ceremonial purposes, all other
rights in the land belonging to another group"."' Clearly there are activities authorised,
indeed in some cases required, by the grant of a pastoral lease which are inconsistent with
native title rights that answer the description in the penultimate sentence. They may or may
not be inconsistent with some more limited right.'27
It therefore seems that in Australia the Meriam people's entitlement "as against
the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment" 12' is only one kind
of Native title, entailing rights that "approach the rights flowing from full ownership
at common law." As we have seen from our discussion of Mabo, a Native title of that
sort arises where an indigenous people as a community is in exclusive occupation of
their territory at the time of acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown, regardless of their
traditional laws and customs. 129 An indigenous people could nonetheless have a less
extensive Native title, if they used land for a specific purpose, such as ceremonial rites,
but lacked exclusive occupation because the land was also used by other indigenous
peoples. 30 Relying on Van der Peet, Toohey J. said that their traditions, customs and
practices would be relevant in those circumstances. But a less extensive Native title of
that sort is really more like what Lamer C.J.C. described in Adams and C6t6 as a free-
standing, site-specific right, that does not necessitate an Aboriginal title to the land
itself. There thus appears to be a divergence between the Supreme Court of Canada's
conception of Aboriginal title and the High Court of Australia's conception of Native
title. For the Supreme Court, Aboriginal title is apparently limited to the kind of title
found in Mabo where there is sufficient occupation and use to warrant an entitlement
"as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment," whereas
126 Wik, supra note 121 at 189-90.
27 Ibid. at 185 (the footnotes in this passage contain these references: 232 R. v. Van der Peet (1996), 137
D.L.R. (4th) 289 at 318, Lamer C.J.C.; 233 Mabo [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. I at 89, 107 A.L.R. I
[per Deane and Gaudron jj.]; 2314 Mabo [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 at 190, 107 A.L.R. I [per
Toohey J.]); see also per Gummow J. at 220, Kirby J. at 284.
2 Mabo, supra note 35 at 217 [emphasis omitted].
129 See text accompanying notes 105-20, supra.
3o In the absence of conflict between the peoples, this could also be viewed as a co-ownership situation:
see supra note I11.
for the High Court, Native title also includes more limited site-specific rights such as
a right to use land only for ceremonial purposes.
The conclusion that Aboriginal title in Canada amounts to rights approaching full
ownership, like the Meriam people were found to have in Mabo, is strongly supported
by the decision of Dickson J. (as he then was) in Guerin v. R.' While that case
involved the Crown's fiduciary duty with respect to reserve lands rather than a claim
to Aboriginal title, Dickson J. held that "[tihe fiduciary relationship between the Crown
and the Indians has its roots in the concept of aboriginal, native or Indian title."' 32
The Crown's fiduciary duty arises because, in his words, "the Indian interest in the land
is inalienable except upon surrender to the Crown."'33 Relying on Calder v. Attorney
General of British Columbia, 134 Dickson J. went on to describe Aboriginal title as "a
legal right derived from the Indians' historic occupation and possession of their tribal
lands."'3 He found further authority for this in Marshall C.J.'s decision in Johnson
v. M'Intosh, 3 6 particularly in a lengthy quotation containing a passage which he
emphasized as follows: "They [the Indians] were admitted to be the rightful occupants
of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it
according to their own discretion."'' 3  While not quoting from it, Dickson J. also
relied on Worcester v. State of Georgia, where Marshall C.J. clarified his position on
Indian title by saying that it was "the universal conviction that the Indian nations
possessed a full right to the lands they occupied."''
While Guerin involved reserve lands, Dickson J. dealt with the issues of the
existence and nature of Indian or Aboriginal title at some length because reserves
generally are areas where Aboriginal title has been specifically recognized by treaty or
unilateral government action. For that reason, the Indian interest in reserves and
Aboriginal title lands is the same. He wrote:
It does not matter, in my opinion, that the present case is concerned with the interest of an
Indian Band in a reserve rather than with unrecognized aboriginal title in traditional tribal
lands. The Indian interest in the land is the same in both cases: see Attorney-General for
Quebec v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1921] I A.C. 401, at pp. 410-11 (the Star Chrome
case). It is worth noting, however, that the reserve in question here was created out of the
ancient tribal territory of the Musqueam Band [on whose behalf the Guerin action was
'3' Guerin, supra note 1. Wilson and Estey JJ. wrote concurring judgments (Estey J. in particular based
his judgment on different grounds), but as Dickson J. wrote for four members of an eight member
bench, his decision is generally regarded as the leading judgment.
m Ibid. at 376.
133 Ibid.
134 Calder, supra note 9.
' Guerin, supra note I at 376.
136 8 Wheat. 543 (1823) [hereinafter Johnson].
'3 Guerin, supra note 1 at 378, quoting from Johnson, ibid. at 574 [Dickson J.'s emphasis].
3' 6 Pet. 515 at 560 (1832).
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brought] by the unilateral action of the Colony of British Columbia, prior to
Confederation. "9
While the Musqueams did not sign a treaty with the Crown providing for the creation
of their reserve out of their tribal territory, many Aboriginal peoples in Canada did sign
treaties to that effect. In some cases those treaties involved the setting aside of reserves
by the Crown after a general surrender of Aboriginal title lands, 4 ° while in other
cases the reserves were made up of lands excluded from the surrender, where
Aboriginal title was retained. 4" However, that distinction makes no difference insofar
as the Indian interest in reserve lands is concerned, as that interest is the same
regardless of how the reserve was created. 42
Since the Indian interest in reserve and Aboriginal title lands is the same,
investigation of the nature of the former will assist us in determining the content of
Aboriginal title. Both statute and case law reveal that, while Indians do not have a fee
simple estate in their reserve lands,'43 they are entitled to the full use and benefit of
those lands, including surface and subsurface resources, regardless of whether they used
1 Guerin, supra note 1 at 379. In this respect, Dickson J.'sjudgment is fully supported by decisions
in the United States, where the courts have held that, in valuing Indian land for the purpose of paying
compensation, it makes no difference whether the land is held by original Indian title (the common
American term for Aboriginal title), or is land specifically reserved by treaty or otherwise; in both
cases, the value of the land is the same as it would be if the Indians held the fee simple, and includes
the value of both surface and subsurface resources: see United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S.
111 at 115-18 (1938) [hereinafter Shoshone Tribe]; United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes,
304 U.S. 119 at 122-23 (1938) [hereinafter Klamath and Moadoc Tribes]; Otoe and Missouria Tribe
v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265 at 288-91 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 848 (1955)
[hereinafter Otoe and Missouria Tribe]; Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926
at 942 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1959); United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F. 2d 786 at 796 (U.S. Ct.
Cl. 1968). In Otoe and Missouria Tribe at 290-91, Littleton J. for the Court of Claims expressly
rejected the argument that the land be valued in accordance with the use the Indians made of it;
instead, appropriate factors to be considered were
the natural resources of the land ceded, including its climate, vegetation, including timber,
game and wildlife, mineral resources and whether they are of economic value at the time of
cession, or merely of potential value, water power, its then or potential use, markets and
transportation - considering the ready markets at that time and the potential market.
In rejecting "the 'subsistence' approach advocated by the Government," at 291 he said: "Values
cannot be determined on the basis of berries and wild fruits." See also United States ex rel. Chunie
v. Ringrose, 788 F. 2d 638 at 642 (9th Cir. 1986), where Fletcher J. for the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals wrote: "Aboriginal title entitles the tribes to full use and enjoyment of the surface and
mineral estate, and to resources, such as timber, on the land."
14' E.g. see the Numbered Treaties, I to 7 of which are reproduced in The Treaties of Canada, supra
note 74 at 313-75.
14' E.g. see the Robinson Treaties, ibid. at 302-309.
142 See "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title," supra note 82 at 148-51.
143 See Guerin, supra note 1, especially per Wilson J. at 349.
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those resources prior to the creation of the reserve. 1" The 1927 Indian Act, for
example, defined "reserve" as
any tract or tracts of land set apart by treaty or otherwise for the use or benefit of or granted
to a particular band of Indians, of which the legal title is in the Crown, and which remains
so set apart and has not been surrendered to the Crown, and includes all the trees, wood,
timber, soil, stone, minerals, metals and other valuables thereon or therein.'
Assuming that Parliament abided by "the valuable rule never to enact under guise of
definition,"'46 this would simply have been declaratory of the interest the Indians
already had in their reserve lands prior to the definition's enactment. "' Moreover,
case law shows that the Indians are entitled to the minerals, including oil and gas, under
their reserve lands. In Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada,'48 the Supreme Court
of Canada held the Crown in right of Canada liable for breach of its fiduciary duty
regarding a surrender of mineral rights under reserve lands in British Columbia in the
1940s. As there would have been no liability if the Indians who brought the action had
not been entitled to the mineral rights, that decision unequivocally supports the position
that the Indian interest in reserve lands includes subsurface resources.' 49 So on the
basis of Dickson J.'s holding in Guerin that the Aboriginal interest in reserve and
Aboriginal title lands is the same, Aboriginal title must include subsurface as well as
surface rights, regardless of the use the Aboriginal peoples made of their lands prior to
European colonization. As we have seen, this conclusion accords with common law
principles as well as with norms of non-discrimination.
4 For more detailed discussion, see "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title," supra note 82 at 148-51. The
United States Supreme Court has taken the same approach: see United States v. Paine Lumber
Company, 206 U.S. 467 at 472-74 (1907); Shoshone Tribe, supra note 139 at 115-18; Klamath and
Moadoc Tribes, supra note 139 at 122-23; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
at 145-46 n. 12 (1980). In Shoshone Tribe at 116, Butler J. for the Court said, in reference to land
reserved by treaty, that "[flor all practical purposes, the tribe owned the land.... The right of perpetual
and exclusive occupancy of the land is not less valuable than full title in fee." Accordingly, the
Shoshone Tribe's interest in the land included minerals and timber, as "[m]inerals and standing timber
are constituent elements of the land itself."
" R.S.C. 1927, c. 98. s. 2(j) [emphasis added].
146 W.F. Craies, Craies on Statute Law, 7th ed. by S.G.G. Edgar (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1971)
at 213.
'47 For the same reason, and because statutes are to be construed if at all possible to preserve the rights
of the Aboriginal peoples, removal of the reference to trees, wood, etc. by an amendment to this
definition, S.C. 1951, c. 29, s. 2(l)(o), would not have diminished the Indian interest in reserve lands:
see "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title," supra note 82 at 149.
48 Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (1995), [19961 2 C.N.L.R. 25.
9 Note that the Beaver Indians, for whom the reserve had originally been set aside pursuant to a treaty
signed with them in 1916, had lived by hunting and trapping: ibid. at 37, McLachlin J. Although they
made no use of the oil and gas which were only discovered under the reserve after the surrender, they
nonetheless succeeded in their claim against the Crown for breach of its fiduciary duty with respect
to those resources.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the Van der Peet, Adams and C6t decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada
clarified that Aboriginal title is just one category of Aboriginal rights, and that free-
standing Aboriginal rights such as hunting and fishing rights can exist independently
of Aboriginal title. In Van der Peet, the Court created a test for identifying free-
standing Aboriginal rights - the "integral to the distinctive culture" test - which it
then proceeded to apply in Adams, C6td and other cases. However, as the Court has not
rendered a judgment since Van der Peet involving a claim to Aboriginal title, it remains
uncertain how the test might apply in that context.
Given Lamer C.J.C.'s comments on Aboriginal title in Adams in particular, it is
possible that the Court will apply the test to determine the existence of Aboriginal title
by requiring proof of a connection with the land that is integral to the distinctive
culture of the Aboriginal claimants. If that happens, the Court may be obliged to
modify aspects of the test, especially the pre-contact time frame for its application, that
are not appropriate for an Aboriginal title claim. It also remains to be seen whether the
Court will apply the test not only to the existence, but also to the content, of Aboriginal
title.
There are compelling arguments for applying general principles relating to
occupation of land rather than the "integral to the distinctive culture" test to determine
the content of Aboriginal title. Those principles can be applied in a way that takes
account of both Aboriginal and common law perspectives, and avoids the
discriminatory consequences that would likely result from treating Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal occupation of land differently by limiting Aboriginal title to uses of the land
that were integral to Aboriginal cultures in the distant past. Otherwise, we could be
faced with a situation where the Aboriginal peoples have a lesser interest in the lands
they have occupied and used for hundreds or even thousands of years than a wrongdoer
acquires by adversely possessing someone else's land for as little as ten years. Such a
result would be hard to defend both domestically and internationally, and would not
generate respect for Canadian law.
Judicial precedents from Australia and the United States support the conclusion
that Aboriginal title is not limited to uses integral to the distinctive cultures of the
Aboriginal peoples at a particular historical moment. In both those countries, the
content of Aboriginal title has been determined by general principles relating to
occupation of land. Moreover, by equating Aboriginal title with the Indian interest in
reserve lands in Guerin, the Supreme Court of Canada has already indicated that the
content of that title is not limited to historic uses. The Court has an opportunity to
apply that decision in its pending judgment in the appeal of the British Columbia Court
of Appeal's decision in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,5" which was heard on June
16 and 17, 1997. The outcome of that case, which involves a claim by the Gitksan and
'5 Delgamuukw, supra note 54. For commentary on the aspects of the Court of Appeal's decision
relating to the sources and content of Aboriginal title, see "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title," supra
note 82.
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Wet'suwet'en Nations to a right of self-government as well as to Aboriginal title, will
have a major impact on the law of Aboriginal rights in Canada. The Supreme Court has
the responsibility to clarify and develop that body of law in accordance with legal
principles, existing precedents, and norms of non-discrimination. The confidence of the
Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian legal system may well depend on the Court's
decision in that case.
